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THE REPUDIATION OF NA TIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES:
THE SUPREME COURT ABANDONS THE STATE
SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
In National League of Cities v. Use, I the Supreme Court asserted that
the constitutional policy of federalism, as embodied in the tenth amend-
ment,2 created an affirmative limitation of Congress's power under the
commerce clause. 3 That limitation precluded the application of the
Fair Labor Standards Act 4 to state and local governments, because such
an application violated that constitutional policy.5 The National League
Court thus departed from a long line of commerce clause precedent and
suggested the existence of a broad, although ill-defined "state sover-
eignty" restriction on Congress's commerce clause power.6
The Supreme Court's subsequent attempts to translate the broad
policy concerns of National League into a workable doctrine, however,
suggest a lack of commitment to those policies. In Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Association,7 and United Transportation Union v.
Long Island Railroad, 8 the Court sharply curtailed the apparent breadth
of its asserted state sovereignty doctrine by defining specific threshold
requirements to judicial consideration of the policy concerns raised in
National League. 9
InEEOCv. Wyoming, 10 its most recent treatment of the principles of
National League, the Court further demonstrated its lack of commitment
to the state sovereignty doctrine. The Court substantially undermined
the constitutional policy concerns it had identified in National League, I I
virtually precluding any future application of the state sovereignty
1 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see infra notes 28-46 and accompanying text.
2 The tenth amendment reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
3 The commerce clause reads: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Com-
merce. . . among the several States . U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
5 See National League, 426 U.S. at 851-52.
6 See id. at 844-45.
7 452 U.S. 264 (1981); see infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text .
8 455 U.S. 678 (1982); see infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 129-55 and accompanying text.
10 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). In EEOCv. Wyoming, the Court upheld the application of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982), to the states. See ina
notes 77-109 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 160-80 and accompanying text.
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doctrine.12
This Note traces the abandonment of the National League doctrine
and argues that the trilogy of cases comprised of Hodel, Long Island Rail-
road, and EEOC v. Wyoming represents the Supreme Court's repudiation
of that doctrine. The Note ultimately concludes that the state sover-
eignty doctrine has no further vitality and thus National League repre-
sents nothing more than an anomaly in commerce clause litigation.
I
BACKGROUND
Although the tenth amendment had played an important role in
earlier commerce clause litigation,' 3 not until the Supreme Court's 1968
12 See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
13 The tenth amendment previously had served as a restriction on Congress's power
under the commerce clause to regulate purely local, although private, activity. See, e.g.,
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
The tenth amendment and a narrow definition of the commerce clause's scope were the two
components of the dual federalism doctrine that the Court applied numerous times to invali-
date congressional legislation. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
See generally Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950). In the 1930s, a
number of New Deal statutes were struck down pursuant to the dual federalism doctrine. See,
e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal Conser-
vation Act of 1935): A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(striking down National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933).
The Supreme Court repudiated the dual federalism doctrine in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936). AfterJones &Laughlin, the Court no longer used the
tenth amendment to insulate private, local activity from congressional regulation. In United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court stated:
[T]he [tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest
that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national
and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution . . . or
that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national govern-
ment might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not
be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
Id at 124. In addition, the Court began to construe the commerce clause much more expan-
sively. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (permitting Congress to regulate crops
grown by farmer for his personal consumption).
Even before abandoning dual federalism, the Court had approved federal regulation of a
state-owned railroad in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). That decision up-
held the application of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1976 & Supp. V
1981), to California's state-owned railroad. Although the Court found that California had
the power as a state to operate a railroad, it concluded that the state's power was subject to
Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce. The Court rejected California's argu-
ment that a state has the same immunity from the commerce clause as it does from the federal
taxing power:
[W]e look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as
marking the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power. But
there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce.
The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by
Congress than can an individual.
United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 185. National League characterized this language as
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decision in Magland v. Wirtz 14 was it suggested that the tenth amend-
ment might serve as an affirmative limitation on congressional power
under the commerce clause. In Wirtz, the Court considered the consti-
tutionality of amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act,1 5 which
applied the Act's minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to state
and local hospitals, institutions, and schools.1 6 Although the Wirtz ma-
jority upheld the amendments,1 7 Justice Douglas concluded in his dis-
sent that the statute as amended was "not consistent with our
constitutional federalism" 18 because it was "a serious invasion of state
sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment.' 9 He found that the
Act disrupted the fiscal policies of the states and threatened their auton-
omy to regulate health and education.20 Justice Douglas argued that
the Court failed to consider the fact that these federal regulations were
to be enforced against sovereign states and that it had incorrectly lim-
ited its inquiry to " 'whether there [was] a rational basis for regarding
them as regulations of commerce among the States.' ",21
Justice Rehnquist's subsequent dissent in Fy v. United Slates22 elab-
orated on the tenth amendment argument presented by Douglas in
Wirtz. In Fy the Court found that Congress had not exceeded its com-
merce clause powers in applying a federally mandated wage freeze to
state and local employees pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of
dicta that was "simply wrong," 426 U.S. at 854-55, although never explaining why it was
dicta nor why it was wrong. By labeling this language dicta, the Court avoided overruling
UnitedStates . California, distinguishing that earlier decision on the ground that the operation
of a railroad is not an activity "that the States have regarded as integral parts of their govern-
mental activities." National League, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18.
For more detailed discussions of the history of commerce clause and tenth amendment
litigation, see Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946 (pts. 1-2), 59
HARV. L. REV. 645, 883 (1946); Comment, The Supreme Court Rejects Constitutional Challenges to
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of/1977, 48 BROOKLYN L. REv. 137, 151-54 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Constitutional Challenges]; Comment, Redefining the National
League of Cities State Sovereigty Doctrine, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1460, 1462-67 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Sovereignty Doctrine].
14 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overrledby National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855
(1976); see injfa text accompanying note 38.
15 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat.
830, 831 (1966) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982)). The entire Act is codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1982).
16 The original Fair Labor Standards Act, which applied only to employees working in
the private sector, was upheld in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
17 "[]t is clear that the Federal Government, when acting within a delegated power,
may override countervailing state interests .... Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 195.
18 Id at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
19 Id.
20 Id at 203.
21 Id The Court noted that regulations promulgated pursuant to Congress's commerce
clause authority are valid if the regulated activity affects commerce and Congress had a "ra-
tional basis" for choosing the particular means to accomplish the goals of the regulation.
Wirtz, 397 U.S. at 190 (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964)).
22 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
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1970.23 Rehnquist argued, however, that when a federal statute regu-
lates a state, the Court's review must go beyond merely examining
whether Congress has acted within its commerce clause powers; the
Court also must examine whether the statute impermissibly regulates a
state in light of the state's "affirmative constitutional right . ..to be
free from . . . congressionally asserted authority. '24
The Fy majority implicitly acknowledged Rehnquist's contention
but reached a different conclusion. In a footnote, the Court noted that
the tenth amendment "is not without significance" 25 and acknowledged
that "[t]he Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States'
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system."126
After examining the challenged regulations, however, the majority
found no "drastic invasion of state sovereignty.1 27 Nonetheless, for the
first time in nearly forty years, the Court raised the possibility that Con-
gress could unconstitutionally impinge on state sovereignty even though
acting within the scope of its delegated authority.
A. National League of Cities v. Usegy
In National League of Cities v. Usegy, 28 the Court adopted Justice
Rehnquist's view that the Constitution establishes an affirmative state
sovereignty limitation on the congressional commerce power. In National
League, the petitioners challenged the 1974 amendments to the Fair La-
bor Standards Act 29 that extended the minimum wage, maximum hour,
and overtime provisions of that act to virtually all state and local public
employees. Although the amendments clearly were within Congress's
power under the commerce clause,30 the Court invalidated them on the
grounds that they unconstitutionally intruded into the "States' freedom
to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions."' a
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist did not base his opinion
on the tenth amendment.3 2 Instead, he grounded the opinion on the
23 Id at 547-48; see Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 796, 799 (1970) (expired Apr. 30, 1974).
24 Id at 553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25 Id at 547 n.7.
26 Id
27 Id at 547-48 n.7.
28 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
29 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(2), 88 Stat.
55, 59 (1974) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982)).
30 See 426 U.S. at 841.
31 Id at 852.
32 Rehnquist mentioned the tenth amendment only once in the opinion, see id. at 842-
43, and the Court probably would have reached the same conclusion even if the amendment
did not exist. See Note, The Realirnation of State Sovereignty as a Fundamental Tenet of Constitu-
tional Federalism-National League of Cities v. Usery, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 736,
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federal-state relationship embodied in the Constitution as a whole.
Rehnquist recognized the existence of "attributes of sovereignty attach-
ing to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress,
not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative au-
thority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it
from exercising the authority in that manner. '33
The National League Court called the power to determine the wages,
hours, and overtime of state employees an "undoubted attribute of state
sovereignty."'34 After analyzing the economic consequences to the states
of congressional intrusion into these matters, the Court found that the
amendments "interfere[d] with traditional aspects of state sover-
eignty."' 35 The majority also concluded that the amendments "signifi-
cantly alter[ed] or displace[d] the States' abilities to structure employer-
employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protec-
tion, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation."'36 Preempting
the authority of the states to make such fundamental employment deci-
sions would destroy their " 'separate and independent existence.' -37
Having found the amendments in question to be unconstitutional,
the National League Court proceeded to overrule Wirtz 38 and distinguish
F9_ 3 9 The Court distinguished Fqy by identifying an overriding na-
tional interest in F!y that justified the temporary regulation of state and
local employees' wages. The Court stated that "[t]he limits imposed
upon the commerce power when Congress seeks to apply it to the States
are not so inflexible as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to
combat a national emergency." 4 Justice Blackmun, concurring, under-
stood the majority's treatment of Fy to mean that the National League
741-42 n.44 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Fundamental Tenet]; see also Note, Federalim and
Federal Regulation of Public Employers: The Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 259, 273-74 (1977) (source of state sovereignty rights is in fabric of Consti-
tution and system it created) [hereinafter cited as Note, Federalism].
Rehnquist also made no mention of the abandoned concept of dual federalism. See Na-
tional League, 426 U.S. at 845; see also supra note 13 (discussing dual federalism doctrine and its
demise); Note, Federalism, supra at 275-76.
33 426 U.S. at 845.
34 Id
35 Id at 845-49.
36 Id at 851.
37 Id (quoting United States v. Coyle, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1910)).
38 National League, 426 U.S. at 853-55.
39 Id at 852-53. The Court also distinguished United States v. Calfornia, 297 U.S. 175
(1936), on the ground that the activity regulated in that case--state operation of a railroad-
"was not in an area that the States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental
activities." National League, 426 U.S. at 854 n. 18; see supra note 13. The National League Court
criticized that earlier decision extensively. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, criti-
cized the Court's treatment ofFV
, 
and United States v. California, arguing that those cases were
irreconcilable with National League. See National League, 426 U.S. at 871-72 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
40 National League, 426 U.S. at 853.
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doctrine required a balancing of state and federal interests by courts
confronting a tenth amendment challenge to a congressional statute.41
Justice Brennan, dissenting, broadly condemned the majority's de-
cision. He contended that the Court had rejected well-established con-
stitutional principles in reaching its decision and warned that the
majority's approach signaled a return to the type of reasoning that pre-
cipitated the constitutional crisis in the 1930s.4 2 Arguing that the na-
tional political system contained sufficient safeguards to protect state
interests, Brennan concluded that the decision reflected "nothing but
displeasure with a congressional judgment. '43
National League prompted a great deal of commentary and uncer-
tainty regarding the decision's ramifications on other congressional legis-
lation and on federal-state relations.44 This uncertainty was principally
a result of the National League Court's failure to define explicitly a judi-
cial test for determining whether a specific federal statute unconstitu-
41 Id at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Many courts and commentators agree with
Justice Blackmun that Justice Rehnquist's treatment requires courts to balance state and
federal interests in determining whether a federal statute unconstitutionally intrudes into
state sovereignty. See, e.g., Woods v. Home & Structures, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-97 (D.
Kan. 1980); Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368, 1369-70
(W.D.N.Y. 1977); Note, Fundamental Tenet, supra note 39, at 750 & n.106; Comment, Constitu-
tional Challenges, supra note 13, at 155-56 & n. 103 (and cases cited); cf. Note, The Constitutional
Limitation Upon Federal Regulation of Municpal Issuers, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 565, 583 (1977)
(arguing that although it is difficult to interpret National League majority opinion as enunciat-
ing balancing approach, such approach will be used for foreseeable future). But see Com-
ment, Sovereignty Doctrine, supra note 13, at 1470 ("[T]he Court's opinion [in National League]
implicitly rejected a balancing approach"). Blackmun's balancing approach was rearticu-
lated as a component of the National League doctrine in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29 (1981).
42 National League, 426 U.S. at 867-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43 I d at 872. Brennan argued that the Court adopted an "essential function" test, al-
though he admitted to having difficulty in comprehending what the Court meant. Id at 875.
For discussions of the "essential function" test, see Note, State Governmental Immunity From Fed-
eral Regulation Based on the Commerce Clause-National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 DE PAUL
L. REV. 100, 116-17; Note, Minimum Wage Requirement Held Inapplicable to State Employees, 60
MARQ. L. REV. 185, 187 (1976).
44 See, e.g., Note, Toward New Safeguards on Conditional Spending: Implications of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 726 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Safeguards];
Note, Fundamental Tenet, supra note 32, at 778 (National League defines correct approach to
constitutional federalism); Comment, At Federalism's Crossroads: National League of Cities v.
Usery, 57 B.U.L. REV. 178, 180 (National League is consistent with constitutional theory re-
quiring judicial protection of states from overly intrusive federal regulation). But see
O'Fallon, The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Comment, 61 OR. L. REV. 395, 400-04 (1982) (ar-
guing that National League is inconsistent with theory of representation).
A number of commentators have examined specific federal statutes and congressional
policies in light of National League. See, e.g., Gold, Clean Water, Federalism and the ResJudicata
Impact of State Judgments in Federal Environmental Litigation, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 1 (1982); Note,
Safeguards, supra; Note, State Sovereignty Challenges to Conditional Grants After Virginia Surface
Mining: Is Section 103of the Distressed Area Readjustment Act of 1983 Constitutional?, 17 COLUM.
J.L. & SoC. PROBs. 497 (1983); Note, Federal Securities Fraud Liability and Municipal Issuers:
Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1064 (1977).
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tionally intruded into the realm of state sovereignty.45 Courts were thus
left to struggle with the broad but vague language of Justice Rehnquist's
opinion. 46
B. National League Applied: Hodel and Long Island Railroad
The Supreme Court returned to the state sovereignty issue in 1981
in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association. 47 Hodel in-
volved the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1978,48 which was designed to protect the environment
from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.49
The district court in Hodel held that the Act violated the tenth
amendment limitation on Congress's commerce clause power.50 The
45 See, e.g., Note, The Constitutionality of the ADEA After Usety, 30 ARK. L. REV. 363, 366
(1976) (National League "does not provide a clear test for determining if other federal statutes
regulating state activities through the Commerce Clause are unconstitutional"); Note, Federal-
ism, supra note 32, at 282 (National League "provides no clear test for determining when state
sovereignty prevails over the national interest"); see also Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598
F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979) (concluding that National League does not outline dimensions
of state sovereignty limitation or articulate a test for determining if function is within pro-
tected state sovereignty).
46 See, e.g., Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979). Many
courts have balanced federal and state interests in applying the principles of National League.
See, e.g., Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977);
Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914 (D.N.D. 1977). Other courts consider the
federal interests only after determining that the activity in question qualifies as an integral
governmental function. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 24
(2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070,
1083 (5th Cir. 1979); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1977).
47 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
48 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982). The Court also faced the constitutionality of this Act
in a companion case, Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), decided on the same day. See
infra note 55.
49 The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act established a two-stage program
to regulate surface mining: the first, interim phase requires immediate enforcement of some of
the Act's environmental protection standards, see 30 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982), and the second,
permanent phase mandates full compliance with the performance standards. See 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1253-1254 (1982). The Secretary of the Interior oversees the interim phase, under which
an enforcement program is established for each state. Under the permanent phase, either the
state or federal government assumes enforcement responsibility. To assume regulatory re-
sponsibility over surface coal mining operations within its borders, a state must develop a
regulatory program and secure the Secretary of the Interior's approval of that program. See
30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982). If the Secretary disapproves the state's regulatory program or the
state does not wish to assume enforcement responsibility, the Secretary must develop and
implement a permanent federal program for that state. See 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982).
50 The district court held that the Act "operates to 'displace the States' freedom to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,'. . . and, therefore, is
in contravention of the Tenth Amendment." Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n
v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 435 (W.D. Va. 1980) (quoting National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976)), rev'dsub nom. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The district court found that although the Act ultimately
affects coal mine operators, it impermissibly restricted Virginia's ability to make essential
decisions "through forced relinquishment of state control of land use planning; through loss of
1054
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Supreme Court reversed and upheld the statute.5 1 The Hodel Court in-
terpreted National League as setting out a three-part test for determining
the success or failure of constitutional challenge to a federal statute en-
acted pursuant to the commerce clause. For such a challenge to succeed
all three of the following requirements must be satisfied:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates
the "States as States." . . . Second, the federal regulation must ad-
dress matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty."
. . . And third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with
the federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional government functions." 52
The Court asserted, however, that even if all three requirements are sat-
isfied, a tenth amendment challenge to a commerce clause enactment
could fail if "the nature of the federal interest advanced . . . justifies
state submission. '53 This test thus incorporated the balancing approach
advocated by Justice Blackmun in his National League concurrence. 54
The Hodel Court applied the test to the statute at issue, concluded
the law did not regulate "states as states," and thus disposed of the
plaintiff's tenth amendment challenge. 55 The Court rejected arguments
that the Act compels the states to establish a regulatory program, noting
that the statute merely establishes a program of "cooperative federal-
ism"'5 6 permitting the states to enact and administer their own regula-
tory programs. 57  Furthermore, the Court stated that the tenth
amendment does not prohibit or displace federal policy over laws regu-
lating private activity,58 thus implicitly categorizing the Surface Mining
and Reclamation Act as such a statute.59
The Court applied the Hodel test in United Transportation Union v.
state control of its economy; and through economic harm, from the expenditure of state funds
to implement the act and from destruction of the taxing power of certain counties, cities, and
towns." Virginia Surface Mining v. Andrs, 483 F. Supp. at 435.
51 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264.
52 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88 (citations omitted) (quoting National League, 426 U.S. at 854,
845, 852).
53 Id at 288 n.29.
54 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
55 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288. Because the Court disposed of the case under the first part of
the test, it made no effort to define the test's other components. As a result, Hodel failed to
resolve many of the uncertainties of National League.
The Court disposed of the tenth amendment challenge in the companion case, Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), on the same ground. Id at 330.
56 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289.
57 Id
58 Id at 288. Justice Rehnquist, who authored National League, concurred in the judg-
ment. In his concurrence Rehnquist discussed only the scope of congressional power under
the commerce clause and did not mention the tenth amendment or the Court's reformulation
of its National League decision. See id at 307-11 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
59 Id at 288.
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Long Island Railroad 60 In Long Island Railroad, the railroad employees'
union and the railroad, which had been state-owned since 1966,61 were
unable to agree to the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement. 62
As a result of their failure to reach agreement, the union brought suit in
federal district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the dispute
was covered by the federal Railway Labor Act 63 and not by New York
state's Taylor Act.64 The union sought to bring the dispute within the
scope of the federal statute because that Act permitted strikes under cer-
tain circumstances; 65 the state statute prohibited all strikes by public
employees.66 After suit was filed, New York sought to preclude the ap-
plicability of the Railway Labor Act to the dispute by converting the
railroad from a private stock corporation to a public benefit corpora-
tion, which would make all railroad employees public employees. 67 De-
spite the state's maneurving, the federal district court, in an
unpublished opinon, held that the federal statute applied in this con-
text.68 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed. The court applied the balancing test suggested by Justice
Blackmun in National League and held that Congress could not regulate
the state-owned railroad. 69
60 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
61 The railroad was acquired by New York State's Metropolitan Transportation Au-
thority. See United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 20 (2d Cir. 1980), rev 'd,
455 U.S. 678 (1982). Although the railroad operated under the auspices of the state, it re-
mained organized as a private stock corporation, see Brief for amicus curiae United States at
4, United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), and its employees were
not considered public employees. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw § 1265(9)(1) (McKinney 1982).
62 United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455
U.S. 678 (1982).
63 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-161, 159a (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
64 N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1983).
65 See 45 U.S.C. § 151-161 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Although the Railway Labor Act
does not specifically authorize strikes, such self-help measures are available once the Act's
dispute resolution procedures have been exhausted. See United Transp. Union v. Long Island
R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 20 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
66 N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 210(1) (McKinney 1983) ("No public employee . . . shall
engage in a strike.").
67 See N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 101(6)(a), 210(1) (McKinney 1983); N.Y. PUB. AUTH.
LAW § 1265(9)(1) (McKinney 1982).
68 See United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd,
455 U.S. 678 (1982).
69 The Second Circuit first determined that the federal regulation "directly displaces
[the] State's ability to structure its employee-employer relationships and to make essential
governmental decisions." United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 25 (2d
Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 678 (1982). Next, the court found that the state's operation of a
passenger rail service was an "integral government function." Id at 27. Since the court
found that the statute displaced New York's ability to make essential decisions with respect to
such functions, it balanced the state and federal interests and concluded that the federal
interests did not justify federal regulatory intrusion. See United Transp. Union v. Long Is-
land R.R., 634 F.2d at 29-30.
In the course of reaching its decision, the Second Circuit distinguished United States v.
California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), which upheld Congress's right to regulate a state-owned
[Vol. 69:10481056
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The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger found that the railroad's challenge failed
the third part of the Hodel test. 70 That component of the test restricts
application of the National League doctrine to statutes that "directly im-
pair [a state's] ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions.' ",71 The Court asserted that it was well-
established that the operation of a railroad by a state is not a traditional
state activity, 72 and held that "a railroad engaged in interstate com-
merce is not an integral part of traditional state activities generally im-
mune from federal regulation under [National League]." 73 Burger
maintained that National League did not "impose a static historical view
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation. ' 74 Instead,
he interpreted that earlier decision as requiring "an inquiry into
whether the federal regulation affects basic state prerogatives in such a
way as would be likely to hamper the state government's ability to fulfill
its role in the Union and endanger its 'separate and independent exist-
ence.' 75 Applying this analysis to the Railway Labor Act's impact on
railroad, on the ground that United States v. California involved only a freight system while the
railway at issue in Long Island Railroad was both a freight and commuter system. United
Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d at 26-27. The Second Circuit's decision has
been criticized by commentators. See Comment, Railroad Regulation 4j2er National League of
Cities: United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 809 (1981);
Comment, UTU v. LIRR: National League of Cities Derailed?, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 189
(1981).
70 United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 684.
71 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853
(1976)).
72 The court cited United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), to support this prop-
osition. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 685. For a brief discussion of
that case see supra note 13. See also supra note 69 (noting that Second Circuit distinguished
United States . Caliornia in United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R.).
73 United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 685. The Court held that
commuter and freight railroads should be treated similarly under the National League doctrine.
Id In doing so, the Court rejected the Second Circuit's distinction between these two types of
railroads. See supra note 68. That distinction had enabled the Second Circuit to distinguish
United States v. Calfornia, 297 U.S. 175 (1936),see supra note 13, from United Transp. Union v.
Long Island R.R. See supra note 69.
The Second Circuit did not construe traditional state activities in a strictly historical
sense and concluded that National League's state sovereignty limitations on congressional ac-
tion applied to all "essential state-provided services." United Transp. Union v. Long Island
R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 678 (1982). Thus, in determining
whether a particular state activity was beyond federal regulatory authority under the National
League doctrine, the Second Circuit examined the importance of the activity rather than
whether the state traditionally engaged in it. Id See Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598
F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979) ("Although [National League] does not contain a specific out-
line of the dimensions of the state sovereignty limitation, the definition suggests that the terms
'traditional' or 'integral' are to be given a meaning permitting expansion to meeting changing
times").
74 United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 686. Burger referred to Na-
tional League's list of traditional activities as dicta. Id
75 Id at 686-87.
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regulation of the Long Island Railroad, the Court concluded that be-
cause Congress has historically regulated railroads and because New
York had acquiesced in the thirteen years of federal regulatory authority
over the Long Island Railroad, the state could not now argue that its
"separate and independent existence" was suddenly threatened by fed-
eral regulation. 76 Thus, the Court found that the state interest did not
outweigh the federal one.
C. The EEOC v. Wyomz'zg Decision
In EEOC v. Wyoming,77 the Court again addressed a challenge to a
federal statute regulating state and local employees. In 1974, Congress
amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1974 (the Age
Act) to extend the Act's coverage to state and local governments. 78 The
Act prohibits various forms of age discrimination against employees
76 Id at 686-90. In a subsequent decision, Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mis-
sissippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), the Court faced another tenth amendment challenge to a federal
statute. That case involved the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1982), enacted in response to the
energy crisis of the late 1970s.
The Court was most troubled by two particular provisions of the Act. One provision
required state utility commissions to consider adoption and implementation of specific regula-
tory standards based on factors listed in the Act, see Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 761. A second provision prescribed procedures that state commissions
must follow during their consideration of these standards. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court, upheld the federal regulatory scheme. He did not, however, apply the Hodel test;
instead he examined only the effect of the federal scheme on the states, and concluded that
the adverse consequences of this federal regulation of a state administrative apparatus were
insufficient to threaten the state's sovereignty. See id at 760-61, 769-71.
Justice O'Connor, dissenting, applied the Hodel test and concluded that the Act was
unconstitutional. O'Connor believed that the Act regulated states as states because Congress
required state regulatory agencies to appraise the appropriateness of various utility rates. Id
at 778-79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She also believed that the Act impinged on attributes of
state sovereignty because it deprived the states of "the power to decide which proposals are
most worthy of consideration, the order in which they should be taken up, and the precise
form in which they should be debated." Id at 779. Furthermore, O'Connor noted that regu-
lating utilities is a traditional state governmental function and that the work of a state regula-
tory commission is the most integral part of that function. O'Connor contended that the Act
taxed the limited resources of these commissions and decreased their ability to address local
regulatory problems, thus "directly impair[ing] their power. . . to discharge their traditional
functions efficiently and effectively." Id. at 781. Finally, she concluded that the federal inter-
ests did not outweigh state interests, especially in light of the fact that Congress could have
chosen a less intrusive means to accomplish its goals. Id at 781 n.8.
Justice Powell objected only to the procedural provision. Id at 771-75 (Powell, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). One commentator has termed the procedural provi-
sion of the Act its "most constitutionally suspect feature." The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96
HARV. L. REv. 4, 189 (1982).
77 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
78 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat.
55, 74 (1974) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982)). The amendment at issue in EEOC a.
Wyoming was passed at the same time as the Fair Labor Standards Act amendments that were
invalidated in National League. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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aged forty to sixty-five, 79 including the discharge of such workers on the
basis of age.80 Congress recognized, however, that in certain situations
age is a relevant employment consideration and thus provided that
otherwise prohibited practices are not unlawful "where age is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal oper-
ation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age." 8'
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v. Wyoming, every
lower court that had considered the constitutionality of the 1975 amend-
ments to the Age Act extending the statute's coverage to state and local
workers had upheld them.8 2 The specific issue in EEOC v. Wyoming was
whether the Age Act preempted a Wyoming statute83 conditioning con-
tinued employment for game and fish wardens who had reached the age
of fifty-five on the approval of their employers. After concluding that
Congress had passed the Act pursuant to the commerce clause,84 the
79 In 1978, Congress further amended the Age Act to cover persons up to the age of 70.
See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 6(a)(1), 92 Stat. 189, 192 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 624 (1982)).
80 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982).
81 29 U.S.C. § 623()(1) (1982).
82 103 S. Ct. at 1059. Most courts treated the Age Act and its 1974 amendments as
having been enacted pursuant to Congress's powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. See, e.g., Arritt v. Grissell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1272 (4th Cir. 1977);
Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287, 1302 (D. Md. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
944 (1982); Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914, 916 (D.N.D. 1977); Usery v. Board
of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Utah 1976).
The Supreme Court's opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), strongly sug-
gests that the fourteenth amendment, unlike the commerce clause, is not subject to a tenth
amendment limitation. Although Fitzpatrick was an eleventh amendment case, it stands for
the general proposition "that the Constitution granted Congress more authority to regulate
state activities when acting pursuant to the fourteenth amendment than when acting pursu-
ant to the commerce power." Note, Tenth Amendment Protects State Mandatory Retirement Policy
Against Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 687, 699 n.80 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Retirement Policy]. Many courts thus upheld the Age Act as a proper
exercise of Congress's power under the fourteenth amendment.
Other courts took the position that Congress had passed the Age Act pursuant to the
commerce clause and upheld the amendments as a legitimate exercise of the power granted
by that clause. See, e.g., Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1 (1981), many courts and commentators concluded that the Court was requiring a clear
showing of congressional intent to act pursuant to the fourteenth amendment for a federal
statute to be considered as having been enacted pursuant to that constitutional provision. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 600 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983);
Note, Retirement Policy, supra at 699. This reading of Pennhurst foreclosed courts from conclud-
ing that the Age Act had been passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment because the Act
failed to contain such a clear statement of intent. Courts thus would be forced to infer that
the Act had been passed pursuant to the commerce clause. In EEOCv. W oming, however, the
Supreme Court suggested that Pennhurst did not mandate such a clear statement of intent. See
infra note 87.
83 Wyo. STAT. § 31-3-107(c) (1977), amended by 1983 Wyo. Sess. Laws § 1, ch. 154.
84 EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 600 (D. Wyo. 1981), reo'd, 103 S. Ct. 1054
(1983); see supra note 82.
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district court held that extending the statute to Wyoming's game and
fish wardens violated the tenth amendment.8 5
The Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four decision.8 6 Writing
for the Court, Justice Brennan first noted that Congress had acted
within the scope of its commerce clause authority in passing the Age
Act.8 7 Brennan then addressed Wyoming's contention that the tenth
amendment precluded the application of the Age Act to its game
wardens.88
In determining whether the Age Act amendments violated the
tenth amendment, Brennan first analyzed the policies and purposes of
National League. The Court in National League, according to Brennan,
drew from the tenth amendment an affirmative limitation on congres-
sional power under the commerce clause because of its concern that im-
posing certain federal regulations on state governments might severely
85 EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 600 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1054
(1983). The district court did not explicitly apply the Hodel test. Instead, the court found
that "an integral portion of government services which the States and their political subdivi-
sions have traditionally afforded their citizens would be affected" if the Age Act were applied
in this instance. Id Noting that the management of wildlife resources by game wardens is a
traditional service of state government as identified by the Supreme Court in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976), the court concluded that the Act would
interfere with the legitimate state policy of ensuring physically capable game wardens. Fur-
thermore, the district court felt that the Act would saddle the state with the responsibility of
"keeping its law enforcement personnel on its payrolls an additional 10 years." EEOC v.
Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. at 600. The court then balanced this important state interest against
the federal interest at stake and found that the state interest outweighed the federal interest.
This conclusion was based in part on the fact that the federal government had a mandatory
retirement age of 55 for some of its law enforcement personnel, which suggested an important
governmental interest in ensuring physically capable law enforcement personnel. Id. The
decision was appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976),
which provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of any judgment invalidating a con-
gressional act. At least one commentator has criticized the district court opinion. See Note,
Retirement Poli, supra note 82.
86 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1054. The majority included Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, and White, all of whom dissented in National League, as well as Justice
Blackmun, who concurred in National League.
87 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061-62. The Court declined to decide whether the
statute was also a legitimate exercise of congressional power under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id at 1064. This issue nevertheless was the subject of considerable disagreement be-
tween Brennan and Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the principal dissent. Brennan
contended that the district court misread Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I
(1981),seesupra note 82, as holding that congressional action could not be upheld under § 5 of
the fourteenth amendment unless Congress expressed a clear intent to act pursuant to that
section. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1064 n.18. Thus, Brennan argued that Pennhurst
had no relevance to EEOC According to Brennan, the Pennhurst Court was construing a
statute, not passing on its constitutional validity. Id at 1064 n.18. Burger responded that the
fourteenth amendment does not give Congress "a 'blank check' to intrude into details of
states' governments at will," id. at 1072 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), and concluded that Con-
gress could not apply the Age Act to the states pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. Id at
1074.
88 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1060.
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impinge on state sovdreignty. 89 In the view of the majority in EEOC v.
Wyoming,
[t]he principle of immunity articulated in [National League] is a func-
tional doctrine . . . whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique benefits of a
federal system in which the States enjoy a "separate and independent
existence" . . . not be lost through undue federal interference in cer-
tain core State functions.9°
The majority next asserted that the Hodel test is the proper stan-
dard for assessing tenth amendment challenges to federal legislation.
Applying that test, Brennan noted that the Age Act clearly satisfied the
first part because it regulated the state as a state. 9 1 He then acknowl-
edged that the Act posed problems with respect to the second part of the
test, the attribute of state sovereignty requirement. He did not resolve
this issue because he disposed of the challenge by applying the third part
of the test. 92
The Court found that applying the Age Act to Wyoming's game
and fish wardens did not satisfy the third requirement of the lodel test
because extending the Act's coverage to these employees "[did] not 'di-
rectly impair' [Wyoming's] ability to 'structure integral operations.' -93
Having found no direct impairment in this regard, the majority upheld
the extension of the Age Act to the states, both as applied in this case
and on its face.94 Brennan concluded "that the degree of federal intru-
sion in this case is sufficiently less serious than it was in [National League]
so as to make it unnecessary. . . to override Congress's express choice to
extend its regulatory authority to the States.195
The Court's conclusion that there was no direct impairment of Wy-
89 Id
90 Id (citations omitted).
91 Id at 1061. Brennan emphasized that this aspect of the test "marks it as a specialized
immunity doctrine rather than a broad limitation on federal authority." Id at 1061 n.10. He
distinguished the direct regulation of states from the regulation of private activity, which, in
his view, is clearly constitutional under the supremacy clause. Id.
92 Id at 1061. Brennan attempted to resolve the uncertainty created by National e gue's
failure to adequately define "attributes of state sovereignty." He claimed that some state
employment decisions are immune from federal regulation. Such decisions include those "so
clearly connected to the execution of underlying sovereign choices . . . 'upon which [the] sys-
tems [of the states'] performance of [their dual functions of administering the public law and
furnishing pubic services] must rest.'" Id n. 11 (emphasis in original).
93 Id at 1060-62.
94 Id at 1064. The Court did not balance the state and federal interests at stake because
it disposed of the challenge to the Age Act on the third part of the Hodel test. Brennan
nevertheless observed that if it had been necessary to balance these interests, the federal inter-
ests might outweigh the state interests. Id at 1064 n.17. Furthermore, the Court thought it
unimportant that Congress had not applied the Age Act to federal employees. Id That fact
had been an important consideration in the district court's decision. See EEOC v. Wyoming,
514 F. Supp. 595, 600 (D. Wyo. 1981), reo'd, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
95 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
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oming's ability to structure integral operations was based primarily on
two considerations. First, the Age Act still allows Wyoming to dismiss
those wardens unfit for duty.9 6 Second, Wyoming may continue to set a
mandatory retirement age of fifty-five by demonstrating that age is a
bona fide occupational qualification. 97 Thus, the majority argued that
the Act does not prevent the state from exercising its discretion in em-
ployment decisions but merely tests the exercise of that discretion
against a reasonable federal standard.98
Finally, the Court addressed the potential impact of the federal reg-
ulation on the state's ability to structure its own operations and priori-
ties. Brennan noted that the Court in National League had been
concerned that the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act 99 to the
states might "threaten . . . a virtual chain reaction of substantial and
almost certainly unintended consequential effects on state decisionmak-
ing." 100 In EEOC v. Wyoming the Court found that there were no such
substantial consequences in applying the Age Act to the states. In
reaching this conclusion, the majority examined two potentially serious
consequences of federal regulation identified in National League-the fed-
eral statute's effect on state finances,' 0' and its effect on the state's abil-
ity to use state employment as a policy tool'0 2-and found that these
effects were insignificant. Therefore, the Court concluded that applying
the federal minimum retirement age of seventy to Wyoming's game and
fish wardens did not pose "anything like the same wide-ranging and
profound threat to the structure of State governance" that the Court
had faced in National League. 103
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, also applied the Hodel test to the
statute in question but he reached a result contrary to that of the major-
ity. Burger had no difficulty in concluding that the Age Act satisfied the
first two requirements of the Hodel test. The act satisfied the first re-
quirement because it regulated states as states, 10 4 and the second re-
quirement because "defining the qualifications of employees is an
essential of sovereignty."'' 0 5
96 Id
97 Id; see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
98 Id
99 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
100 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
101 The Court acknowledged that state payrolls might increase if the Age Act retirement
age of 70 were enforced against the states because older workers tend to get paid more than
younger ones by virtue of seniority. The majority, however, contended this increase would be
offset by a decrease in pension costs resulting from the fact that fewer people would be receiv-
ing pensions. See id at 1062-63.
102 The Court could not imagine any public policies that would be frustrated by the Age
Act. Id at 1063-64.
103 Id at 1062.
104 Id at 1069 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
105 Id at 1069-70. Burger concluded that the prerogative to set mandatory retirement
1062 [Vol. 69:1048
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With respect to the third requirement of the Hodel test-that the
statute impair traditional governmental functions-the Chief Justice
found the Age Act objectionable on several grounds. First, the Act
could increase certain state employment expenses such as insurance, sal-
ary, pension, and disability costs.' 06 Second, the Act would preclude
states from employing those best able physically to perform the job.10 7
Furthermore, Burger rejected the majority's suggestion that the bona
fide occupational qualification provision of the Act provided states with
adequate discretion in making age-related employment decisions; Bur-
ger argued that "[g]iven the state of modern medicine, it is virtually
impossible to prove that all persons within a class are unable to perform
a particular job or that it is impossible to test employees on an individ-
ual basis."' 0 8 Having determined that all three parts of the test were
satisfied, Burger balanced the interests at stake and found the federal
interest inadequate. 0 9
II
ANALYSIS
In National League of Cities v. Usey, 110 the Supreme Court estab-
lished a flexible, policy-based constitutional doctrine that restrained the
federal government from interfering with the sovereign functioning of
the states. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, I
the Court developed a three-part test for determining when federal legis-
lation unconstitutionally impinges on state sovereignty. 12 Although the
Hodel Court claimed that the test was consistent with the decision in
National League, it severely limited National League by replacing that ear-
lier decision's flexible restraints on federal action with a narrow, rigid
standards is an attribute of sovereignty because over one-half of the states and Congress have
enacted mandatory retirement age laws for their own employees, indicating that "such laws
are traditional methods for insuring an efficient workforce for certain governmental func-
tions." Id at 1069.
106 Id at 1070.
107 Id at 1071.
108 Id. at 1072 (emphasis in original).
109 Id EEOC v. Wyoming also featured an interesting historical debate between Justice
Stevens, who joined the majority, and Justice Powell, who dissented. Stevens argued that the
commerce clause "was the Framers' response to the central problem that gave rise to the
Constitution itself." Id at 1065 (Stevens, J., concurring). He contended that although the
clause has been construed strictly at various times in the past, the "Court has [recently] con-
strued the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of the Framers of the Constitution-to con-
fer a power on the national government adequate to discharge its central mission." Id at
1066. Justice Powell called this a "novel view of our Nation's history." Id at 1075 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). He argued that commerce was not the major concern of the Framers and that
"[c]reating a national government within a federal system was far more central than any 18th
century concern for interstate commerce." Id at 1076.
110 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see supra notes 28-46 and accompanying text.
111 452 U.S. 264 (1981); see supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
112 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88.
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test that disregarded underlying policy concerns. The Court further un-
dermined its National League doctrine in EEOC v. Wyoming. 113 In that
decision, the Court considered a statute that conceivably satisfied the
first two threshold requirements of the Hodel test. Thus, for the first
time, the Court was forced to reach the merits of a tenth amendment
challenge to a federal statute and to determine whether that statute un-
constitutionally impaired a state's ability to structure integral activities.
In resolving this question, the Court substantially undermined the Na-
tional League doctrine and demonstrated that National League's underly-
ing concerns are no longer important considerations. The Hodel test and
the EEOC v. Wyoming decision represent an abandonment of the National
League doctrine.
A. The Policies Underlying National League
In National League, the Supreme Court perceived a congressional
threat to the ability of the states to fulfill their constitutionally man-
dated role in the federal system. To counteract this threat, the Court
articulated an affirmative constitutional limitation on Congress's power
to regulate the states.
The National League Court contended that this restraint on Con-
gress's authority was similar to other affirmative constitutional limita-
tions on congressional power." 4 This restriction, however, never before
articulated by the Court," 5 differed from previously accepted limita-
tions because it is not expressly stated in the Constitution.
The National League Court derived the limitation on congressional
power from the federal-state relationship embodied in the Constitution
as a whole." 6 In that relationship, states were considered independent,
autonomous units, secure from federal encroachment;" 7 they were
deemed to play an "essential role . . . in our federal system of govern-
ment."" I8 To preserve state sovereignty and thus the federal system, the
Court construed the Constitution to prohibit Congress from exercising
"'power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function effectively in a federal system.' "119
113 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983); see supra notes 77-109 and accompanying text.
114 Other affirmative constitutional limitations mentioned by the Court include the right
to a jury trial and the due process requirement. National League, 426 U.S. at 841.
115 Prior to National League, the Court had used the tenth amendment in commerce clause
litigation to restrict Congress's ability to regulate purely local matters. This was the doctrine
of dual federalism. See supra note 13.
1 16 National League, 426 U.S. at 852; see Note, Federalism, supra note 32, at 274 (suggesting
that outcome of National League would have been same even if Constitution did not contain
the tenth amendment).
117 See generally THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (D. Elazar ed. 1969).
118 National League, 426 U.S. at 844.
119 Id at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)); see United
Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 687 (1982) (stating that National League
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The Court in National League struck down the 1974 Fair Labor
Standards Act amendments 120 because it concluded that they
threatened the states' ability to fulfill their essential role in the federal
system. In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined the effect of
the amendments on the states.1 21 Although the Court conjectured that
the amendments might have serious financial and policymaking conse-
quences for the states, concern over these consequences was not the pri-
mary reason for barring the application of the provisions to state and
local governments. Instead, the Court stated that "the dispositive factor
is that Congress has attempted to exercise its Commerce Clause author-
ity to prescribe minimum wages and maximum hours to be paid by the
States in their capacities as sovereign governments." 122 This reasoning
suggests that the Court would have reached the same result regardless of
the amendments' actual impact upon the states. 123 Thus, the Court in-
dicated that a mere attempt by Congress to regulate minimum wages
and maximum hours of state employees constituted a threat to the
states' ability to fulfill their constitutional role in the federal system.
In National League, the Court considered a federal statute that
clearly attempted to regulate fundamental employment decisions made
by states while engaged in "traditional state activities"' 124 or "traditional
governmental functions."' 125 The Court prohibited Congress from inter-
fering with a state's ability to make such decisions. 126 Furthermore, the
Court noted that the effects of federal regulation may "impermissibly
interfere with [a state's] integral governmental functions. 1 27
National League thus suggests that certain types of state activities are
absolutely protected from federal regulation without regard to the con-
sequences of such regulation. In addition, National League suggests that
other types of state activities are insulated from congressional regulation
if the effects of such regulation impinge on the state in such a way as to
threaten its separate and independent existence. Unfortunately, the Na-
tional League Court failed to indicate what state activities were abso-
lutely protected from federal regulation.128 The Court also neglected to
requires an inquiry into whether basic state prerogatives would be affected "in such a way as
would be likely to hamper the state government's ability to fulfill its role in the Union").
120 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(2), 88 Stat.
55, 59 (1974) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982)).
121 National League, 426 U.S. at 846-51.
122 Id at 852.
123 See id at 851-52.
124 Id at 849-51.
125 Id at 852.
126 Id at 851-52. The fact that the Court approved Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542
(1975), however, suggests the existence of a "national emergency" exception under which
Congress may regulate fundamental employment decisions.
127 National League, 426 U.S. at 851.
128 Based on the facts of National League, the power to make wage and hour employment
decisions is accorded absolute protection. The Court also explicitly mentioned some exam-
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indicate what types of consequential effects it considered relevant in de-
termining whether a state's sovereignty was threatened, and how serious
those consequences must be to invalidate a federal statute.
B. The Hodel Test
The Court in Hodel attempted to explain the National League deci-
sion by defining standards for its application.1 29 The Court did not sim-
ply reformulate National League's policy and rationale into a workable
standard, however; instead, it severely restricted the scope of the National
League doctrine and limited its applicability. In Hodel, the Court cre-
ated a three-part test to guide courts in deciding tenth amendment chal-
lenges to congressional statutes. Although the Court stated the test in
three parts, it actually embodies four requirements. To violate the tenth
amendment, a federal statute must: first, regulate " 'States as
States' ,,;130 second, address matters that are " 'attribute[s] of state sover-
eignty' "';131 third, regulate areas of traditional state functions; and
fourth, impair a state's ability to structure integral activities. 132
Prior to its decision in EEOC v. Wyoming, the Court had applied
only two of these requirements. In Hodel, the Court considered the
states as states requirement and, in United Transportation Union v. Long
Island Railroad, 133 it considered the traditional state activities require-
ment. In these two decisions, the Court indicated that both these re-
quirements must be satisfied before a court can make a policy-based
inquiry into whether the federal statute in question directly impairs a
state's ability to structure integral operations. Thus, the Court effec-
tively established thresholds that must be crossed before the concerns
that troubled the Court in National League can be considered.
The extent to which these threshold requirements will affect the
National League holding depends on the manner in which they are ap-
plied. In Hodel, the Court indicated that the states as states requirement
will be applied rigidly; 134 the Long Island Railroad Court gave conflicting
indications as to how the traditional state activity requirement will be
applied. 135 Rigid application of these two requirements effectively ig-
nores National League's broad, policy-based rationale.
pies of traditional state activities: fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health,
and parks and recreation. Id. at 851.
129 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264.
130 Id at 287 (quoting National League, 426 U.S. at 854).
131 Id at 288 (quoting National League, 426 U.S. at 845).
132 Id
133 455 U.S. 678 (1982); see supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
134 See Hod, 452 U.S. at 287-93.
135 See United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 684-86.
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1. The Stales as States Requirement
In National League, the Court distinguished between "laws regulat-
ing individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of
[federal and state] government"1 36 and laws directed to the "States as
States."' 37 The Hodel Court adopted this distinction from the earlier
opinion and turned it into a rigid rule, thus drawing an arbitrary line
that undermined the flexibility of National League. In National League, the
Court was concerned with congressional statutes that threatened the
states' ability to fulfill their constitutional role, 38 and not with the par-
ticular manner in which federal law threatened the states. The broad
policy concerns articulated in National League suggest that the decision
was intended to invalidate any federal statute that unconstitutionally
infringed on state sovereignty, regardless of whether the statute was di-
rected primarily at private business or at a governmental entity. By re-
quiring that an invalid statute regulate "states as states," however, the
Hodel Court rejected the possibility that federal legislation regulating
only private business might exceed National League's tenth amendment
limitation on congressional intrusion into state sovereignty. Thus, the
Hodel Court implicitly held that a state's separate and independent
existence can never be threatened when Congress does not directly regu-
late a state.
Unfortunately, the Court did not substantiate this conclusion. In-
stead, the Hodel majority relied on the supremacy clause 39 to assert
that, because Congress could preempt state regulation of surface mining
entirely, it could also choose to offer the states a role in the regulatory
scheme.' 40 Although this argument has an appealing simplicity, it ig-
nores the fact that many of the concerns that troubled the Court in Na-
tional League are also present when Congress indirectly imposes burdens
on the states by regulating private business. As some commentators
have noted, congressional regulation of surface mining may impose sub-
stantial costs and have other detrimental effects on state activities such
as land-use planning.14' Therefore, whether such a regulation affects a
136 National League, 426 U.S. at 845.
137 Id. This distinction may simply indicate that National League was not intended to
signal a return to the abandoned concept of dual federalism. See Note, Federalism, supra note
32, at 276.
138 See supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
139 The supremacy clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land
.... U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
140 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290.
141 See, e.g., Note, Tenth Amendment Challenges to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977- The Implications of National League of Cities on Indirect Regulation of the States, 49
FORDHANt L. REv. 589, 601-08 (1981); Note, A Critique of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining




state in a manner that threatens its separate and independent existence
is a question that demands close scrutiny; yet under the Hodel test, that
question will never be asked.142
2. The Traditional Governmental Functions Requirement
The Hodel Court erected a second threshold requirement that had
to be satisfied before National League's limitations on congressional intru-
sion into state sovereignty became applicable. To satisfy this require-
ment, a party challenging a federal statute had to demonstrate that the
"States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their
ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions. ' "143 The Hodel Court once again lifted a phrase from the Na-
tional League opinion and turned it into a rule. Unfortunately, it failed
to define traditional state activities in more detail than the National
League Court had. Instead the Hodel Court incorporated the phrase in
an ill-defined, potentially rigid test. Hodel thus did little to remedy the
uncertainty of National League. 144
142 One commentator has suggested that Hodel's states as states requirement "severely
limits the rhetoric of National League of Cities. " Note, Constitutional Challenges to the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act, 43 MONT. L. REv. 235, 242 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Challenges]. Another commentator has indicated that
[i]n interpreting the test of National League of Cities to be applicable only to the
regulation of the "States as States," the [Hodel] Court has achieved the
diffeult [sic] task of clarifying that decision in a remarkably simple fashion.
Effectively, the Court has foreclosed the majority of tenth amendment chal-
lenges that might have been brought following National League of Cities by
simply demanding that there must be shown a direct assertion of authority
over a state.
Comment, Constitutional Challenges, supra note 13, at 159 (footnote omitted); see Note, Chal-
lenges, supra, at 242 ("[T]his distinction appears to leave no middle ground for considering the
primary effects of regulation on states when the states are not the principal object of regula-
tion."); Note, Critique of Hodel, supra note 141, at 197 ("[T]he level of interference and the
degree to which the state's ability to structure integral operations is impaired are factors that
are totally irrelevant unless the federal law directy regulates the states.") (emphasis in origi-
nal).
Even if the Hodel Court had found that the statute before it regulated Virginia as a state,
the Court might have permitted such regulation. In Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), the Court upheld a federal statute directing state regulatory
authorities to participate in a federal energy regulatory scheme. The Court reasoned that
because Congress constitutionally could preempt state regulation entirely, Congress could
also grant the states a role in the regulatory scheme. Id at 765. The Court's premise, how-
ever, that allowing the states a regulatory role is less drastic than preempting their regulatory
activities completely, is not necessarily correct. See id at 786-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, Congress did not merely grant the states a regulatory role, it ordered them to
take specific action. See supra note 76.
143 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 (quoting National League, 426 U.S. at 852) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
144 See supra notes 45-46. Although the National League Court's discussion of traditional
state activities allowed it to distinguish United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), see
supra note 13, it seemed to serve no other purpose. See National League, 426 U.S. at 854 n. 18.
The Court in National League gave specific examples of traditional state activities: fire
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From a strictly historical perspective, a requirement that a federal
statute regulate a traditional state activity before it can exceed tenth
amendment limitations on congressional intrusion into state sovereignty
sharply curtails the National League doctrine. Under such an approach, a
state activity would be immune from federal regulation only if the state
had engaged in the activity for such an extended period of time that a
court would consider it part of the state's traditional functions. In light
of this threshold requirement, the importance of the activity in provid-
ing services to state citizens, the effect of federal regulation on the state's
ability to conduct such services, and the technological developments cre-
ating new state activities become irrelevant concerns. Yet the first two
of these concerns were important considerations in the Court's National
League decision.1 45 Thus, a strict historical construction of traditional
state activities sharply diminishes the scope of National League.
In United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad, 146 the Court
sent conflicting signals as to its approach to the issue of what activities
satisfyHodel&s traditional state activities requirement. Chief Justice Bur-
ger, writing for a unanimous Court, disposed of the case in a manner
suggesting a strictly historical approach to traditional state activities.
He rejected the state's contention that its commuter railroad system 147
should be exempt from federal regulation and upheld the application of
the federal Railway Labor Act to that system, reasoning that the opera-
tion of passenger railroads "has traditionally been a function of private
industry, not state or local governments."' 148  Burger noted that al-
though some passenger railroads recently have come under state control,
this fact "does not alter the historical reality that the operation of rail-
roads is not among the functions traditionally performed by state and
local governments."' 149
Despite this seemingly rigid historical approach, the Chief Justice
claimed he was not "looking only to the past to determine what is 'tradi-
tional.' "150 He contended that National Leagues "emphasis on tradi-
prevention, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. National League, 426 U.S. at
851. The Court explicitly stated that its list of traditional state activities was "not an exhaus-
tive catalogue of the numerous line and support activities which are well within the area of
traditional operations of state and local governments." Id. at 851 n.16. Although this sug-
gests that there may be other activities within the scope of National League, the decision did
not indicate how to identify them. Hodel did little to remedy this uncertainty.
145 See National League, 426 U.S. at 851.
146 455 U.S. 678 (1982); see supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
147 Burger concluded that the case was governed by the Court's decision in United States
v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), see supra note 13, which upheld federal regulation of a
state-operated freight railroad. The Court thus did not distinguish between commuter rail-
roads and freight railroads in applying the traditional state requirement. United Transp.
Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 684-86.
148 United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 686 (footnote omitted).
149 Id. (emphasis in original).
150 Id
1984] 1069
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1048
tional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state
sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view of state
functions generally immune from federal regulation." 15' Instead, Burger
claimed that National League required "an inquiry into whether the fed-
eral regulation affects basic state prerogatives in such a way as would be
likely to hamper the state government's ability to fulfill its role in the
Union and endanger its 'separate and independent existence.' "152 Bur-
ger further added to the confusion by suggesting a historical standard
that favored federal regulation and ignored state interests. He would
not allow states "to erode federal authority in areas traditionally subject
to federal statutory regulation"'153 by "acquiring functions previously
performed by the private sector."u 54
Thus, Long Island Railroad further clouded the issue of what state
activities are protected by National League. 155 The Court's reasoning and
151 Id
152 Id at 686-87 (quoting National League, 426 U.S. at 851). Burger's inquiry suggests that
he views National League as requiring a balancing of state and federal interests. Burger found
a strong federal interest evidenced by comprehensive federal railroad regulation, United
Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 687-89, and concluded that it outweighed the
state's interest, especially in light of New York's acquiescence to 13 years of federal regulation.
Id at 689-90.
153 Id. at 687.
154 Id
155 For example, lower federal courts have reached conflicting conclusions with respect to
whether a municipal mass transit system constitutes a traditional governmental function for
purposes of determining whether the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1982), can constitutionally be applied to these systems. Compare Alewine v. City Council, 699
F.2d 1060 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (upholding application of the FLSA) and Kramer v. New Castle
Area Transit Auth., 677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir.) (same), reh'g denied, (1982) with Enrique Molina-
Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841 (1st Cir. 1982) (prohibiting application
of FLSA) and San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 (W.D.
Tex.) (same), probable jurisdiction noted, 104 S.Ct. 64 (1983). Arguably intracity bus and rail
service is the type of activity that should be protected under National League. An intracity
mass transit system often is vital to the commercial success of a city. Many large cities such as
Baltimore and Washington only recently have established large municipal rail systems. See
TIME, Jan. 16, 1984, at 18. Many other cities have offered such services for a long time, either
by operating bus and rail systems directly, or by contracting with private companies to pro-
vide such services. It is possible that such mass transit systems could fall within the protections
of National League.
The Donovan decision has an interesting history. In Donovan, the district court originally
sustained a tenth amendment challenge to the application of the FLSA to San Antonio's mass
transit system. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982),
the Court vacated the decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of its intervening
decision in United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. See Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 457 U.S. 1102 (1982). On remand, the district court reached the same conclu-
sion, holding that even though San Antonio did not own and operate the mass transit system
until 1959, it had a long history of involvement in the system prior to that year and was thus
engaged in a "traditional state activity." Donovan, 557 F. Supp. at 448. Therefore, although
San Antonio did not assume direct control of its mass transit system until 1959, its involve-
ment in the system had begun much earlier. The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdic-
tion to review that decision. 104 S.Ct. 64 (1983).
Donovan offers the Court another chance to elaborate on the meaning of traditional state
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holding suggest a rigid historical approach but dicta in the opinion indi-
cates otherwise.
C. EEOC v. Wyoming." The Abandonment of National League
Hodel and Long Island Railroad reflect the Court's conclusion that its
National League decision unduly restricted Congress's power to regulate
state activity. The Court in these later decisions apparently concluded
that National League' language was so broad that it raised questions re-
garding the constitutionality of a range of commerce clause legislation
affecting the states. 5 6 Therefore, Hodel's requirement that a congres-
sional statute regulate states as states before it can be considered consti-
tutionally suspect may have been an attempt to reconcile National
League's broad language with the more limited intent of the National
League Court.15 7 The fact that Justice Rehnquist, who authored National
League, did not object to the "states as states" requirement in either Ho-
del or Long Island Railroad158 strongly suggests that this was the Court's
goal. Hodel and Long Island Railroad, however, did not completely elimi-
nate the National League state sovereignty doctrine: certain state activi-
ties' 59 remained insulated from congressional regulation in some
instances. In EEOC v. Wyoming, however, the Court took the final step
and completely abandoned National League-s state sovereignty doctrine.
In EEOC v. Wyoming, the Court acknowledged that the statute in
question regulated states as states engaging in a traditional state activ-
ity. 160 Because the Age Act as applied to Wyoming's game and fish war-
dens satisfied these two threshold requirements of the Hodel test, the
Court addressed a previously undefined component of the Hodel test:
activities. The fact that the Supreme Court remanded Donovan to the district court for recon-
sideration in light of United Tramp. Union v. Long Island R.R. suggests that it might consider
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), see supra note 13, to be controlling. The two
cases, however, are distinguishable because San Antonio has a bus as well as a rail system,
whereas the holding and logic of United States v. Califomia were based entirely on the fact that
the public service in question was an interstate railroad carrier. Thus, United States v. California
seems to be inapposite. The Court thus may be forced to determine whether an intracity
mass transit system is an activity protected by National League, and in doing so it may further
indicate what types of activities constitute traditional state activities.
156 See supra note 44.
157 The Court's opinion in Hodel indicates that a federal statute that regulates a state
only indirectly is not constitutionally suspect under National League, regardless of how burden-
some that regulation may be upon the state. Cf EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062 n. 14
("We do not mean to suggest that. . . consequential effects could be enough, by themselves,
to invalidate a federal statute.").
158 See supra note 58.
159 It is unclear, however, what activities are included within this category. The Court's
opinion in United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), failed to identify
the state activities falling within the scope of National League. See supra notes 146-55 and ac-
companying text.
160 The National League Court explicitly identified park management as a traditional state
activity. National League, 426 U.S. at 851; see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
1984] 1071
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Whether the Age Act "'directly impair[ed]' [Wyoming's] ability to
'structure integral operations.' "161
In applying this undefined component of the Hodel test, Justice
Brennan, writing for a divided Court, 162 turned to the language and
spirit of National League for guidance in formulating a standard.1 63 He
contended that National League did not "create a sacred province of state
autonomy"1 6 4 but instead enunciated a functional doctrine 6 5 "to ensure
that the unique benefits of a federal system . . .not be lost through
undue federal interference in certain core state functions."' 66 Under
Brennan's conception of National League, a court applying the third com-
ponent of the Hodel test-the impairment of integral operations require-
ment-need only consider whether Congress has interfered with a state's
performance of a core function t67 to such a degree 68 that the state's
separate and independent existence is threatened. 69 Brennan's ap-
proach therefore required an examination of the direct and consequent-
ial effects of applying the Age Act to Wyoming's game and fish wardens.
By focusing solely upon the effects of a congressional enactment,
Brennan's analysis rejected the possibility that a federal statute will be
invalidated on the ground that it merely lessens or preempts a state's
power to make decisions in a particular field. The statute will be upheld
unless it unconstitutionally threatens that state's sovereignty. Thus,
under Brennan's view, Congress can regulate any state activity as long
as the extent of that regulation does not endanger the state's ability to
function as an autonomous unit.
Brennan's approach ignores a predominant concern of the National
League Court: that a state's power to make certain decisions is so inter-
twined with the state's ability to function as an autonomous unit that
any federal infringement of that power, regardless of how minimal that
161 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061-62 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288; National
League, 426 U.S. at 852).
162 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
163 EEOC V. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1060-61. It is significant that Justice Brennan
wrote the majority opinion because he had denied the existence of the state sovereignty doc-
trine in his National League dissent. In his dissenting opinion, Brennan stated that "there is no
restraint based on state sovereignty . . . expressed in the Constitution," National League, 426
U.S. at 858, and "nothing in the Tenth Amendment constitutes a limitation on congressional
exercise of powers delegated by the Constitution to Congress." Id at 862.
164 103 S. Ct. at 1060. But see Note, Federalism, supra note 32, at 282 ("[T]he Court's
holding [in National League], read alone, implies that certain state and local functions may
never be interfered with under the commerce power regardless of the national interest in-
volved.") (footnote omitted).
165 103 S. Ct. at 1060.
166 Id
167 Id
168 Id at 1062.
169 Id. Brennan stated that the result in National League also depended on considerations
of degree. Id.
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infringement might be, constitutes a threat to the state's separate and
independent existence.170 The dispositive factor in National League was
not the extent to which Congress attempted to regulate the states but
rather the exercise of its commerce clause power to withdraw from the
states the power to make fundamental employment decisions. 7 1 The
result in National League, given the Court's reasoning, would have been
the same even if the effects of federal regulation were not as serious as
the petitioners had alleged. 72
As Justice Brennan noted in his National League dissent, that deci-
sion "operate[d] as a[n] . . .absolute prohibition against congressional
regulation [under the Commerce Clause] of the wages and hours of state
employees"1 73 engaging in traditional state activities. 74 The fact that
Congress withdrew from the states the power to set minimum wages and
maximum hours itself constituted a threat to the states' ability to fulfill
their constitutional role. Brennan's interpretation of National League as it
appeared in his dissenting opinion is thus inconsistent with his majority
170 In National League, the Court called the states' power to set employees' wages an "un-
doubted attribute of state sovereignty," National League, 426 U.S. at 845, and held that Con-
gress may not constitutionally infringe upon this power. The Hodel Court converted the
phrase "attributes of sovereignty" into one component of a three-part test, Hodel, 452 U.S. at
287-88. Under Hodel, a federal statute was not unconstitutional merely because it regulated
attributes of state sovereignty. The Hodel Court, however, did not define what it meant by
"attributes of sovereignty." In EEOCo. Wyoming, Justice Brennan defined "attributes of sov-
ereignty" to include the power to make employment decisions that "are so clearly connected
to the execution of underlying sovereign choices that they must be assimilated into [those
choices] for purposes of the Tenth Amendment." 103 S. Ct. at 1061 n. 11. The Court's hold-
ing in National League, which denied Congress the power to set minimum wages and the power
to set maximum hours for state employees, suggests such employment decisions come within
Brennan's definition. National League, 426 U.S. at 850-51. Under the Hodel test, even if the
power to set minimum wages and maximum hours is deemed an attribute of sovereignty as
defined by Brennan in EEOC v. Wyoming, this finding, by itself, would not preclude congres-
sional regulation. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88. Such a finding, however, might prohibit federal
regulation under National League.
In EEOC v. Wyoming, Brennan acknowledged that it is difficult to determine whether the
power to set retirement ages for certain state employees is an attribute of sovereignty. EEOC
v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061. This suggests that the power to decide retirement ages may
be "clearly connected to the execution of underlying sovereign choices," id at 1061 n. 11, and
thus possibly insulated from congressional regulation under National League. The Hodel test
enabled Brennan to avoid this difficult issue in EEOC o. Wyoming.
171 See National League, 426 U.S. at 851.
172 Id ("We do not believe particularized assessments of actual impact are crucial to
resolution of the issue presented . . ").
173 National League, 426 U.S. at 875 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174 Where an activity is not traditionally under the purview of the state, the National
League doctrine does not apply. Thus, in Alewine v. City Council, 699 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir.
1983) and Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Auth., 677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 786 (1983), see supra note 155 and accompanying text, the courts concluded that
operating a mass transit system is not a traditional state activity and approved the applica-
tion of the Fair Labor Standards Act to such systems. The First Circuit has reached the
opposite conclusion. See Enrique Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d
841 (1st Cir. 1982). See generally supra note 155 (discussing mass transit within the context of
National League).
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opinion in EEOC v. Wyoming. in his National League dissent, he chastised
the majority for absolutely prohibiting federal regulation in a particular
field of state activity; yet in his majority opinion in EEOCv. yomZg, he
interpreted National League as permitting some degree of federal regula-
tion in all state activities.
Having interpreted National League to permit congressional regula-
tion of any state activity as long as that regulation does not threaten the
state's sovereignty, Brennan then analyzed the effects of the Age Act on
Wyoming. He compared the effects of the Act with the effects of the Fair
Labor Standards Act at issue in Natznal League and concluded that the
degree of federal intrusion in EEOC v. Wyoming was "sufficiently less
serious than . . . in National League of Cities so as to make it unnecessary
for [the Court] to override Congress's express choice to extend its regula-
tory authority to the States."' 75
In comparing the effects on the states of the statutes under review
in National League and EEOC v. Wyoming, Brennan limited his inquiry to
concerns that had troubled the Court in National League: first, whether
applying the Age Act to Wyoming's game and fish wardens directly in-
fringed upon the state's ability to achieve the legitimate state policy un-
derlying its retirement age; and second, whether two specific indirect
consequences might result from such infringement-adverse financial
consequences, and the inability to use employment as a public policy
tool. 176 Brennan found that the federal intrusion in this case was mini-
mal, an outcome that, given his general hostility to the National League
doctrine, 177 was certain. But Brennan's arguments in support of his con-
clusion are unpersuasive, and thus he failed adequately to distinguish
National League. 178
175 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
176 Id at 1062-64 (citing National League, 426 U.S. at 845-52). The Court characterized
its inquiry with respect to the financial consequences as legal in nature. See EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 103 S. Ct. at 1063. Yet at one point the Court explicitly rejected a factual contention
concerning certain financial consequences that Wyoming had raised. Id at 1063 n.15.
177 See supra note 163.
178 Brennan's discussion of the Age Act's effect on Wyoming's ability to accomplish a
legitimate goal, the physical preparedness of its game wardens, demonstrates the inadequacies
of his arguments. Brennan contended that the Age Act has a minimal impact on Wyoming's
ability to achieve this goal. He asserted that the state may assess the fitness of its game war-
dens on a case-by-case basis and "dismiss those wardens whom it reasonably finds to be un-
fit." 103 S. Ct. at 1062. Furthermore, Brennan noted that under the Age Act, Wyoming may
continue to retire wardens at age 55 if it can demonstrate that age is a "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification." See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1982). He concluded that the Age Act's im-
pact on Wyoming's ability to accomplish its legitimate policy is insignificant when compared
with the effects of the statute considered in National League.
Brennan's reasoning is questionable, especially his suggestion that Wyoming might rely
on the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense as a justification for continuing
to retire game and fish wardens at age 55. As Chief Justice Burger argued in his EEOC v.
Wyoming dissent, the BFOQ defense may be an inadequate check on federal infringement of
state autonomy because courts generally impose a "high standard of what constitutes a bona
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Even if Brennan had conducted a broad, policy-based inquiry into
the effects of applying the Age Act to Wyoming's game and fish war-
dens, the outcome might have been the same. Such an inquiry would
have examined whether any interference with Wyoming's ability to set
the retirement ages of its game wardens threatened its separate and in-
dependent existence. Thus, EEOC v. Wyoming's narrow holding that ex-
tending the Age Act to Wyoming's game and fish wardens is
constitutional may be correct. Brennan, however, went further and con-
verted National League-s broad, policy-based inquiry into a limited analy-
sis of the specific effects of a federal statute on a state.1 79 Furthermore,
Brennan restricted that inquiry by suggesting that a federal statute
could be unconstitutional as applied to a traditional state activity only
when the effects of that statute were as severe as the effects of the statute
invalidated in National League. 180 EEOC v. Wyomings narrow ruling up-
holding the statute as applied to Wyoming's game and fish wardens thus
does not repudiate the National League doctrine entirely because the
Court did not expressly overrule National League.
The broader holding of EEOC v. Wyoming, however, that the Age
Act is constitutional on its face, 18 1 suggests an abandonment of the pol-
icy underlying National League. In EEOC v. Wyoming, Brennan limited
the scope of his inquiry to the specific effects of the Age Act on Wyo-
ming's game and fish wardens, 182 but he upheld all possible applications
of the statute. Brennan's holding therefore, must rest on the unarticu-
fide occupational qualification." 103 S. Ct. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For example,
Burger noted that one circuit requires an employer to show "'a factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all persons within the class . . . would be unable to perform safely
and efficiently the duties involved, or that it is impossible or impractical to deal wtih persons
over the age limit on an individualized basis.'" Id at 1072 (quoting Arritt v. Grisell, 567
F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977)); see Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 431 F.2d 224, 236
(5th Cir. 1976) (holding that employer was required to show factual basis for believing that
all or substantially all of persons over 40 years of age are unable to drive buses safely); Weeks
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that in order to
rely on BFOQ defense, employer must show factual basis for believing "all or substantially all
[class members] would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job in-
volved"); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 407
(1976) (criticizing "all or substantially all" formulation). Commenting on this standard, Bur-
ger noted that "[g]iven the state of modern medicine, it is virtually impossible to prove that
all persons within a class are unable to perform a particular job or that it is impossible to test
employees on an individual basis." EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1072 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
179 See supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
180 In light of Brennan's hostility to National League, he probably would conclude that
the Fair Labor Standards Act could constitutionally be applied to Wyoming's game and fish
wardens. In National League, Brennan contended that the Fair Labor Standards Act should be
upheld under all circumstances. See National League, 426 U.S. at 871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1064.
182 Although Brennan conducted a broad inquiry into the financial impact of the Age
Act, id at 1062-63, the rest of his analysis was specifically directed to Wyoming's game and
fish wardens. Id at 1062-64.
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lated, unproven, and unlikely premise that Wyoming's game and fish
wardens represent the entire spectrum of state and local employees en-
gaged in traditional state activities. Brennan thus foreclosed all future
attacks upon the Age Act based on the statute's intrusion into state sov-
ereignty. Even if a state could demonstrate that the burdens of the Age
Act on a particular group of its public employees engaged in providing
an integral state service were so onerous that the state was forced to
curtail that service,1 8 3 the state would still be remediless because of
Brennan's conclusion that the effects of the Age Act on Wyoming's
game and fish wardens are "minimal" in character.18 4 By precluding
the remedy that National League would have provided in such a case, the
Court in EEOC v. Wyoming abandoned and repudiated National League's
state sovereignty doctrine.
CONCLUSION
In National League, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
protects state sovereignty by affirmatively limiting congressional power
to regulate the states under the commerce clause. In two subsequent
decisions, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association and
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad, the Court indicated
that the tenth amendment did not really limit congressional power to
the extent that National League had suggested and that the state sover-
eignty doctrine was not as broad as National League had implied. Fi-
nally, in EEOC v. Wyoming, the Court completely undermined the state
sovereignty doctrine articulated in National League by demonstrating
that the tenth amendment actually does not limit Congress's power to
regulate states under the commerce clause. Thus, in EEOC v. Wyoming
the Court repudiated the doctrine that, in the words of Justice Stevens,
had represented the "modern embodiment of the spirit of the Articles of
Confederation." 185
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